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Part 1: Distracted by Fracking?
Over the past few years, the United States has found 
itself in the midst of a major boom in oil and gas 
production. Rapid expansion in the use of a drilling 
technique called hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” 
has opened up previously unreachable pockets of oil 
and gas, and returned the U.S. to its historic position 
as a major global producer of these fossil fuels. 
And it seems the boom may be coming to 
California. Once a leading producer of oil in the U.S., 
California’s production has fallen off dramatically 
over the years as oil fields age and are depleted. 
But could America’s fracking-fueled oil resurgence 
breach the oil fields of California, particularly in 
the relatively untapped Monterey Shale? Could 
a fracking revolution once again make California a 
leading producer of domestic oil? And if so, what 
might this mean for the state’s aggressive clean 
energy and climate goals? 
Given the dramatic examples of North Dakota, 
Texas and Pennsylvania, where widespread use 
of fracking has helped oil and gas production soar, 
it might seem inevitable for California to be the 
next boom state. The Monterey Shale formation, 
which runs from north-central through southern 
California, has billions of barrels of oil locked away 
in its underground nooks and crannies. Petroleum 
geologists and engineers, always searching for the 
next strike, are feverishly seeking the technological 
fix to unlock those riches.
Politically, it’s the same fight as elsewhere – 
environmental regulations have been drafted, 
legislation written and fought over, Hollywood films 
made, coalitions pro and con organized -- all focused 
on the potential benefits, and threats, of widespread 
fracking.
A “sleeper” oil field technology?
But in California, at least, the obsession with fracking 
may be misplaced. In recent months, policymakers 
have begun to realize that the debate about fracking 
may be a distraction from the technology that’s 
the more likely candidate for tapping the Monterey 
Shale: A technique, already widely in use in the oil 
industry, known as “acidizing.”
It’s not widely discussed in publicly, but for some 
time oil companies have found acidizing more 
effective in the Monterey Shale than fracking. 
Acidizing typically involves the injection of high 
volumes of hydrofluoric acid, a powerful solvent, 
(abbreviated as “HF”) into the oil well to dissolve 
rock deep underground and allow oil to flow up 
through the well. Conventional fracking, in which 
water and other chemicals are pumped at high 
pressure to create fissures in the rocks, reportedly 
does not work well in many parts of the Monterey 
Shale – a rock formation that is typically folded and 
shattered by geological fault action, thus making 
fracking less effective.
A critical tool – but mistakes can be 
deadly
In the oil patch, hydrofluoric acid can therefore be a 
critical tool. But HF is also one of the most dangerous 
of all fluids used in oil production – and indeed in any 
industrial process. It is used in many oil refineries 
nationwide to help turn oil into gasoline and other 
products; while accidents are rare, they can be fatal. 
Currently, large amounts of HF (precise volumes 
are an industry secret) are routinely trucked around 
California and mixed at oilfields. Critics call it a disaster 
waiting to happen. There have been minor HF leaks 
in other states, though no major catastrophes in the 
U.S. such as a recent HF tragedy in Korea. 
Yet acidizing remains almost totally unregulated. 
State and federal rules currently being drafted in 
Sacramento and Washington, DC, make no mention 
of acidizing. An exception is legislation currently 
under debate in Sacramento, authored by Sen. Fran 
Pavley, D-Agoura Hills, who has spearheaded much 
of the state’s climate laws in recent years. 
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Whether California regulates acidizing may have 
national and global implications. Although the state 
appears to be the first to do major experimentation 
with high-volume acidizing, the rapid expansion of 
unconventional oil technologies in shale formations 
in other states suggests that oil companies might 
try to export any successful California experiments 
to other locations. 
Industry abuzz, but details are secret
Hydrofluoric acid is typically mixed with water and 
other chemicals, with HF concentration normally less 
than 9 percent. However, oil company executives 
have said they are experimenting in California with 
higher concentrations and pressures, testing the 
boundaries of geology, engineering – and safety. 
Exactly how high those experimental concentrations 
and pressures are is a closely held secret. At a May 
2013 industry conference in Bakersfield, executives 
in attendance speculated nervously about what 
their competitors were doing. Each company was 
clearly working on its own secret formula, trying to 
find its own recipe for success.
The buzz among conference attendees was about 
Occidental Petroleum, which had demonstrated 
much success with HF acidizing at its Elk Hills field.
“As you have seen here, companies are 
experimenting widely with acidizing,” said Maysam 
Pournik, a geology professor at the University 
of Oklahoma who spoke at the event.2 “Nobody 
is saying exactly what they are doing, because 
the Monterey Shale is extremely complex, and 
companies need to try new methods at the limits.”
What is acidizing?
There are two types of acid treatment: matrix acidizing and acid fracking.
A matrix acid job is performed when acid is pumped at low pressure into the oil well and into the 
texture of the reservoir rocks. The acids dissolve the sediments and mud solids that are inhibiting the 
permeability of the rock, enlarging the natural pores of the reservoir and stimulating the flow of oil.
Acid fracking involves pumping acid at moderately high pressure – though considerably lower 
pressures than conventional fracking. The acids physically fracture the reservoir rock and dissolve 
the sediments that are blocking the flow of oil.
Because HF is so successful at dissolving anything it touches, drilling companies add other substances 
to the mix to prevent the acid from dissolving the oil well’s steel casings – which are intended to keep 
the oil and chemicals from leaching into the surrounding rocks and water table. After the acid job is 
performed, the used acid and oil well sediments are sucked out in a process called backflush.
A low-volume form of acidizing has long been used nationwide, including in California. This process 
typically occurs in aging oil wells during the final stages of production, as a means of coaxing out the 
last dregs of oil before the well is abandoned. In contrast, the tactic now being pioneered in California 
appears to involve much higher volumes of injected acid as a primary technique for new wells. 
In past years, both HF and hydrochloric acid (HCl) were used, depending on the geology. However, 
the sandstones and silicates that are prevalent in the Monterey Shale lend themselves especially 
to HF use.1
In many cases, HF is created at the oilfield by mixing hydrochloric acid with ammonium fluoride 
and immediately injecting the mix down the well. Creating the HF on site is accepted as safer than 
offsite production, as it reduces the risk of transport accidents. 
In other cases, however, HF is mixed at a remote location, trucked to the oilfield, mixed there and 
then pumped downhole.
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Some executives said they believe their competitors 
were experimenting with HF concentrations as high 
as 30 percent. But others downplayed such talk.
“If you use that much HF, you will melt your well 
casings,” said Paul Gagnon, senior vice president of 
Central Resources, a Denver-based oil firm. “It’s not 
doable.”3 Left unsaid was the environmental danger 
– that HF could breach the double or triple steel 
walls of the well casings and enter the surrounding 
water table, putting local water supplies at risk.
A recognized human hazard
HF is commonly used in oil refineries, where it 
serves as a catalyst to produce high-octane gasoline. 
It is one of the most hazardous industrial chemicals 
in use, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control. HF can cause severe burns to skin and 
eyes, and can damage lungs in ways that may not be 
immediately painful or visible. Overexposure causes 
painful, deep-seated and slow-healing burns and 
ulcers. If absorbed through the skin in even minute 
amounts and left untreated, HF may cause death.
The dangers of HF are compounded by its 
extreme volatility at relatively low temperatures. 
If temperatures are cool, HF is a liquid. But at 67.1 
degrees F, HF boils into a dense vapor cloud that, if 
released into the open, does not dissipate, hovers 
near the ground and can travel great distances – 
meaning the risks of a spill to nearby population 
centers are significant.
The National Fire Protection Association system 
rates hydrofluoric acid in the most dangerous 
category of hazardous materials. Hydrofluoric 
acid also is recognized on the Superfund list of 
Extremely Hazardous Substances. As a powerful 
corrosive, it dissolves nearly anything – research 
on matrix acidizing lists “corrosion” as one of the 
primary challenges.4
There appears to be no research or other publicly 
available information about HF’s use in oil and gas 
production or its potential effects on groundwater 
supplies. But the risks are clear.
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Part 2: The Most dangerous chemical you’ve never heard of
Editor’s note: In part 1 of our series on the Monterey 
Shale, Next Generation researcher Rob Collier 
outlined the technical challenges of developing the 
Monterey Shale oil field – and how a technique 
known as “matrix acidizing,” which uses hydrofluoric 
acid to dissolve underground rock formations, may 
be the key to its development. In Part 2 we explore 
the risks of widespread HF use.
“No industrial process risks more lives from a single 
accident than does the subject of this report – 
alkylation using hydrogen fluoride in oil refining. Fifty 
American refineries use HF alkylation to improve 
the octane of gasoline. Many are situated in or close 
to major cities, including Houston, Philadelphia, Salt 
Lake City and Memphis. In some cases, more than 
a million residents live in the danger zone of a single 
refinery. All in all, more than 26 million Americans 
are at risk.”
So says a 2013 survey of 50 U.S. oil refineries by 
the United Steelworkers union, which represents 
refinery workers. The survey found that “over a five-
year period, the refineries in the study experienced 
131 HF releases or near misses and committed 
hundreds of violations of the OSHA rule regulating 
highly hazardous operations.”
In July 2009, an explosion blasted the Citgo East oil 
refinery in Corpus Christi, Texas, critically injuring a 
worker and sparking a fire that burned for more than 
two days. 
In September 2012, in Gumi, South Korea, about 
eight tons of HF gas  burst  from the Hube Global 
chemical  plant. The leak killed five workers and 
severely injured at  least 18 others,  including plant 
employees and emergency personnel. An estimated 
3,000 local villagers required medical treatment.
Because of these well-documented risks, the USW 
is advocating for refineries to stop using HF and to 
substitute safer chemicals and processes.
A joint investigation in 2011 by ABC News and the 
Center for Public Integrity came to an equally chilling 
conclusion:
At least 16 million Americans, many of them 
unaware of the threat, live in the potential path 
of HF if it were to be released in an accident or a 
terrorist attack, a joint investigation by the Center 
for Public Integrity and ABC News has found. 
The government maintains closely controlled 
reports outlining worst-case scenarios involving 
highly hazardous chemicals. The Center 
reviewed reports for the 50 refineries that use 
HF. The reports describe the most extreme 
accidents anticipated by the plants’ owners. The 
information is not published and is not easily 
accessible by the public.
A recent spate of refinery equipment 
breakdowns, fires and safety violations has 
heightened concerns. Over the past five years, 
authorities have cited 32 of the 50 refineries 
using HF for willful, serious or repeat violations 
of rules designed to prevent fires, explosions 
and chemical releases, according to U.S. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
data analyzed by the Center. These “process 
safety management” standards require 
companies to conduct inspections, analyze 
hazards and plan for emergencies.
In all, at those 32 refineries inspectors found 
more than 1,000 violations, including nearly 
600 at the BP refinery in Texas City, Texas, 
where 15 workers were killed and 180 injured 
in a 2005 explosion. Although only some of the 
violations involved HF, they can be an indicator 
of operational weaknesses, particularly 
worrisome at refineries using the chemical, 
industry and government insiders say. Even 
a fire causing little damage can foreshadow 
a more serious event, the American 
Petroleum Institute, the oil industry’s main 
trade association, notes in a 2010 guidance 
document for its member companies.
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Some worst-case scenarios described in 
company filings with the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency are particularly chilling: 
An HF release from the BP refinery in Texas 
City, for example, could total 800,000 pounds, 
travel 25 miles and put 550,000 people at 
risk of serious injury, according to BP’s own 
calculations, provided to the EPA.
And a release from the Marathon refinery near 
Minneapolis could total 110,000 pounds, travel 
25 miles and threaten 2.2 million people.
In response to safety concerns, the two California 
refineries that use HF – Valero in Wilmington and 
ExxonMobil in Torrance – have adopted a modified 
form of HF that is less volatile. This new form remains 
extremely dangerous, as described in a 2010 fact 
sheet by Honeywell, a leading manufacturer of 
modified HF, which called its product: “extremely 
corrosive and destructive to tissue. Causes severe 
burns. May be fatal if inhaled, absorbed through 
skin, or swallowed. Specialized medical treatment 
is required for all exposures.”
Despite all this information about HF use in refineries 
and other industrial settings, little is known about 
HF practices in California oilfields, and oil companies 
are tight-lipped.
Remarkably, California health and safety regulators 
appear to be unaware that HF is being used. Clyde 
Trombetta, Cal-OSHA’s chief supervisor for both 
oilfield and refining operations, wrote in a June 14, 
2013 email that he didn’t know that HF was being 
used in oilfields. “When it comes to Hydraulic 
Fracking in California I do not believe the industry 
uses hydrofluoric acid and hydrochloric acid in its 
matrix,” he wrote.5
Chemical safety experts say that California’s 
pioneering use of HF poses unique challenges. 
“You have uncounted numbers of trucks moving HF 
around the state, it’s unclear whether the workers 
are trained in proper safety protocols, whether local 
first responders are prepared, or whether anyone 
is prepared for a potentially lethal accident of 
significant proportions,” said Kim Nibarger, a health 
and safety specialist for the United Steelworkers.“It 
seems totally unregulated.”
A 2008 report by the Center for American Progress, 
“Chemical Security 101: What You Don’t Have Can’t 
Leak, or Be Blown Up by Terrorists,” listed HF as the 
nation’s second most dangerous industrial chemical 
at risk of being used in terrorist attacks. The report 
highlighted HF’s prevalence in oil refineries, but did 
not mention its use in oilfield production – perhaps 
because there had been almost no attention to date 
to the Monterey Shale.
The author of that report, Paul Orum, now says that 
because of the typically low security in oil services 
trucking and oilfields themselves, HF is a risk. 
“The consequences of a deliberate HF spill could 
be catastrophic, depending on the location, and 
California would be well advise to consider this in 
its policies,” he said.6
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A giant regulatory gap
In recent years, as the national debate over fracking 
became a cause celebre from New York to Hollywood, 
acidizing remained relatively obscure – and cloaked 
in relative secrecy. In California and elsewhere, 
oil companies face no disclosure requirements 
for acidizing. As a result, there is little information 
available to the public about when, where or what 
kinds of acids, what depth, what strength, what 
volumes, or even whether they are doing it.
There is no mention of the topic in the U.S. BLM’s 
new draft rule for well stimulation methods, which 
includes hydraulic fracturing, on federal and Native 
American lands.
In California, the attention to acidizing came 
belatedly. After years of being a backwater in the 
fight over fracking, California entered the fray in 
earnest in early 2013. A flurry of media coverage 
about fracking’s potential in the Monterey Shale 
prompted environmental groups and legislators to 
jump on the national bandwagon. It was all fracking, 
all the time. Acidizing, however, was unmentioned.
The California Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal 
Resources (DOGGR) finally agreed to write 
regulations to govern the fracking process. Its initial 
draft, released in December 2012, made no mention 
of acidizing, but DOGGR’s chief deputy director 
recently indicated the practice might be included 
in a forthcoming draft.  Industry officials, who have 
supported DOGGR’s initial version, suggested they 
would fight to stop any inclusion of acidizing.
A new draft of regulations is expected to be released 
in August 2013, with final approval, after additional 
hearings, likely in mid-2014.
Gearing up for regulatory battle
The door was cracked open in April, when the South 
Coast Air Quality Management District issued new 
regulations that would mandate disclosure of “the 
names and quantities of chemicals, non-trade and 
trade secret, and other process information within 
60 after days after completion of well activities.” 
The measure did not impose any limits on acidizing, 
but it marked the first time anywhere in the United 
States that oil companies were even required to 
disclose acidizing.
But soon after, acidizing came into the sphere of 
interest among activists and legislators. In June, 
Senator Fran Pavley scheduled a hearing in the 
state Senate to investigate the use of acidizing. 
She invited Chevron, Occidental and Venoco and 
the oilfield services company Halliburton to testify 
at the hearing, asking them to provide information 
on “the type and number of oil stimulation 
treatments, including acid-based treatments” that 
the companies use and plan to use in California.
All three companies declined, deferring to two 
industry associations to address the panel’s 
questions. “We use acid because it’s effective,” 
testified Paul Deiro of the Western States Petroleum 
Association. “I’m unaware of any disasters 
related to this.” He urged the legislators to avoid 
“unnecessary” regulation of acidizing.7
Faced with stonewalling, Pavley promptly amended 
her bill – which until then had been focused 
exclusively on fracking – to add a requirement 
requiring full disclosure of acidizing activities. She 
also added acidizing to the bill’s authorization for the 
state to commission an independent, peer-reviewed 
study of the environmental health effects of well 
drilling techniques.
This study, to be completed by Jan. 1, 2015, would fill 
in critical gaps in the nation’s knowledge of fracking’s 
impacts, which have not been widely studied; it would 
also be the only study to date about the potential 
impacts of acidizing. The study’s findings could prove 
to be be a major boon to other states and nations 
that are seeking a responsible approach to the rapid 
expansion of fracking and acidizing. 
Whatever the study’s conclusions, it could give 
the general public and policymakers alike the 
information they need to make informed decisions 
about a formerly obscure drilling technique that is 
now entering the limelight.
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Part 3: The Climate conundrum
With elected officials and energy experts buzzing 
about the potential for a major boom in oil production 
from California’s Monterey Shale, little attention has 
been given to the risk that a new oil boom could 
undermine the state’s plans for addressing climate 
change. If the as-yet unrealized surge in Central 
and Southern California’s Monterey Shale were 
to materialize, it could boost the state’s climate 
pollution, just as the state grabs the mantle as a 
global leader in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Public discussions of the climate impact of an oil 
boom have been limited by lack of information 
about potential rates of growth in oil production 
or greenhouse gas emissions. The key questions 
revolve around scale and speed: How much of the 
oil would be produced, and over what time period? 
Would oil production grow at the same speed as 
shale oil booms in North Dakota and Texas? Or 
would technical difficulties slow any increase to a 
modest, manageable crawl? Or, perhaps as likely as 
any other scenario, would the oil mirage turn into 
just another over-hyped, Western bust?
Predicting a boom: At what speed?
The mother lode of California’s potential oil bonanza 
is expected to be the Monterey Shale, a deep layer 
of rocks stretching from the southern edges of 
the San Francisco Bay Area all the way to Orange 
County. Geologists believe the Monterey Shale may 
hold 15.4 billion barrels of technically recoverable 
oil, or more than twice the shale oil deposits of all 
other states combined.
Around the United States, new drilling techniques 
have upended conventional wisdom, causing 
unprecedented surges in production from oil and 
gas reserves that had previously been inaccessible. 
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This rapid shift in potential – from reserves that 
were believed to be off limits – has yet to fully arrive 
in California, where the geological complexity of the 
Monterey Shale has so far stymied oil companies’ 
attempts to unlock its secrets. Petroleum engineers 
are feverishly trying new drilling techniques that they 
hope will solve these riddles. If and when there is a 
“breakthrough” moment, the pace of development 
could take off like a rocket.
Many existing factors could help accelerate 
Monterey Shale production growth:
• Size. The Monterey’s reserves dwarf those of 
other, more established U.S. shale plays, with 
estimates showing twice the amount of oil of 
North Dakota’s Bakken field and Texas’s Eagle 
Ford field combined. 
• Location. The Monterey’s deposits are located 
in a densely populated state with a huge market 
for oil conveniently located a short distance 
away. In some cases, such as the Los Angeles 
oil basin, the market is literally overhead.
• Property holdings. Because the Monterey 
generally lies directly underneath the state’s 
existing oilfields, oil companies could take 
advantage of their existing properties and 
facilities to speed development. 
• Transport. According to the California Energy 
Commission, the state’s pipelines and rail 
networks have enough capacity to absorb at 
least a doubling of the state’s total oil production, 
and probably much more.8 
• Refinery capacity. In-state oil production only 
provides about one-quarter of the state’s oil 
refinery consumption of about 2 million barrels 
per day; because of the U.S. near-total ban on 
crude exports, California could probably absorb 
a major boost of oil output with no need to seek 
expansion of existing refineries.
All these factors contrast markedly from conditions 
in the Alberta tar sands, where huge amounts of 
crude are thousands of miles from any market – and 
could wind up stranded unless the Keystone XL or 
other export pipelines are built.
Many economists who study the oil industry 
say that if the Monterey’s technical problems are 
resolved, market and political factors would lead oil 
companies to try to maximize their output, just as 
they have done in North Dakota and Texas.
“The economic stakes make the development 
of Monterey energy inevitable,” said David 
Roland-Holst, professor of economics at UC 
Berkeley. “Institutional constraints, including 
refinery regulation and both de jure and de facto 
environmental oversight, will be tempered by two 
forces: The first is the state’s fiscal situation, for 
which these resources will be seen by some as 
a panacea,” he said. “In other words, public tax 
revenues from oil-related economic activity are truly 
additional and would represent a very big bag of 
political candy.”
Although California is the only major oil producing 
state that does not charge a severance tax, the oil 
industry gains considerable political clout through its 
claims that it generates billions of dollars in indirect 
tax revenue. A coming report by Next Generation 
will take a close look at the veracity of these claims.
Roland-Holst said a Monterey boom is unlikely to 
be slowed significantly by political concerns: “The 
second factor moderating environmental concerns/
objections could be the history of fracking in California. 
A variety of these methods have already been in use 
here for over 20 years, without documentation of 
significant adverse effects,” he said.9
Other experts noted that California’s oil prices are 
thoroughly integrated with the world market, so with 
the international Brent benchmark at roughly $110 
per barrel and futures prices predicting no significant 
decrease, the market’s appetites will be powerful.
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“No firm will make a field development decision 
based on that field’s impact on the global market, 
because no single field is large enough for it to 
matter on its own,” said Kenneth Medlock, senior 
director of the Center for Energy Studies at Rice 
University.10  A similar view came from Severin 
Boreinstein, co-director of the Energy Institute at 
the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley: “The 
effect of Monterey shale on the world oil price will 
be minimal so that won’t be a constraint on rampup. 
I think rampup constraints will be more technical 
than economic.”11
Production scenarios: an informed 
guessing game
Based on recent history, a wide range of scenarios 
is possible:
• California’s production from conventional oil 
wells has slid gradually over the years, from 
about 1.1 million barrels per day at its high in 
1985 to 536,000 barrels in 2012. From 2007-
2012, the rate of decline was 3 percent annually. 
This decline stopped in 2012 and output is 
expected to remain flat in the next two or three 
years, as high oil prices cause companies to 
eke out extra production in their decades-old 
fields. The Monterey provides little of California’s 
current production.
• After years of decline, U.S. total oil production is 
now rising rapidly, fueled by sudden increases 
in North Dakota and Texas. Nationwide oil 
production rose 5.1 percent annually from 2007-
2012 and is projected to increase by 13 percent 
annually during 2012-2014, according to the 
Energy Information Administration.
• Alberta’s tar sands reserves are far larger than 
those of the Monterey, with an estimated 
168 billion barrels recoverable. But tar sands 
production has grown at a slower pace than 
shale plays south of the border, rising from 1.1 
million barrels per day in 2007 to 1.9 million in 
2012, or 11 percent annually. 
• Texas’ oil production has doubled since 2007, to 
about 2.3 million barrels per day, for an increase 
of 14 percent annually.
• North Dakota’s daily oil output has soared by 
more than 500 percent since 2007, to about 
750,000 barrels per day in early 2013, or 40 
percent annually. 
Academic and industry experts say they are unsure 
what sort of growth projections could be realistic 
for the Monterey. 
Page 12 | Drilling the Monterey Shale Part 3: The Climate conundrum
Richard Behl, professor of Geology at California 
State University at Long Beach, points out that the 
Monterey Shale is still relatively unexplored, and its 
extremely complex geological structure presents 
challenges that have never been solved at other 
oilfields.12 Unlike the state’s traditional oilfields, 
where companies focus on the convex folds known 
as “anticlines” in which oil has collected over the 
millennia, the Monterey’s oil is believed to be more 
dispersed underground.
“We don’t know a lot about the deeper structures of 
existing oilfields. No one ever drilled into those, and 
it’s expensive to drill deep,” Behl said. “Everyone 
has been drilling into anticlinal folds and traps, 
and that’s where production has been for the past 
century, so the oil companies know that well. But 
the Monterey is different.”
Behl, who has extensively studied the Monterey 
Shale and is widely viewed as the state’s chief 
academic expert on the subject, admitted he was of 
two minds about its potential.
Asked whether California could ramp up at the 
speed of North Dakota, he said that scenario was 
“too speculative.” But he also volunteered that once 
oil company geologists figure out the Monterey’s 
secrets, growth could be rapid. 
“California could ramp up just as fast as North 
Dakota or Texas,” he said. “It’s possible. But there 
are too many variables to know for sure.”
“A lot of hype”
Other experts are more skeptical of California’s 
ability to rapidly ramp up shale oil production. 
“There’s a lot of hype in this issue,” said Robert 
Garrison, a professor emeritus of geology at UC 
Santa Cruz. “Assuming exponential rates of growth 
in the Monterey seems very risky to me, and not 
necessarily substantiated by much.”13
Oil companies and their supporters promise 
explosive job growth from a Monterey oil boom, 
citing a bullish, oil industry-funded 2013 report by 
the University of Southern California. That study 
predicted even faster rates of growth in California 
oil production than those of North Dakota. But 
industry spokespeople now demur when asked 
about specific production levels. “Gosh, we have 
no idea about where the production levels could 
go,” said Tupper Hull, vice president of the Western 
States Petroleum Association. “We’re hard at work 
on solving the technical issues.”14
In sum, the scenarios are varied. What is clear, 
however, is that any net increase in California oil 
production would cause a corresponding increase 
in greenhouse gas emissions. Evaluating those 
emissions scenarios is the key task for state leaders 
focused on achieving their aggressive climate goals.
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Part 4: Monterey Shale: Twice as polluting as Keystone XL?
As California decision makers ponder how to plan 
for a potential new oil boom in the Monterey 
Shale, they are faced with the daunting task of 
calculating many complex factors – not only a wide 
range of oil development scenarios, but also the 
potential increase in fracking and acidizing, the 
implications for state budgets, possible impacts on 
in-state consumption and refinery activities, and 
serious gaps in understanding of the geologic and 
environmental issues that may arise with a boom.
Much of California’s current petroleum output is 
categorized as heavy or extra-heavy oil, meaning it is 
more viscous and requires more energy and time to 
refine into fuel than lighter grades of crude. In many 
ways, it is similar to the thick “bitumen” petroleum 
that comprises Alberta’s tar sands. Lighter grades, 
such as those found in Texas and North Dakota, 
have lower carbon emissions footprints because 
they require less energy to extract and refine.
All heavy and extra-heavy grades require a variety 
of energy-intensive methods to liquefy, extract from 
the ground, and refine into gasoline, diesel and other 
transportation fuels. As a result, many California 
oilfields have greenhouse gas emissions per barrel 
similar to the Alberta tar sands crudes, according 
to the California Air Resources Board. In 2007, 70 
percent of California’s active wells produced extra-
heavy or heavy crude, and 56 percent of new wells 
drilled were extra-heavy or heavy.15
As a rule of thumb, California’s inland oilfields tend 
to have heavier crude, while coastal and offshore 
oilfields have lighter varieties. For example, the 
carbon intensity of the state’s largest oilfield, Kern 
County’s Midway-Sunset, and its eighth and ninth 
largest, San Ardo in Monterey County and Coalinga 
in Fresno County, are as high or higher than those 
of the Alberta tar sands. Most oilfields in the San 
Joaquin Valley are heavy or extra heavy. 
In contrast, the oil along the coast tends to be 
lighter. Many fields in the Los Angeles Basin, Ventura 
Basin and offshore Santa Barbara produce cleaner 
burning, light, sweet grades of crude that are as 
coveted by refiners as the light, sweet blends from 
Saudi Arabia and Ecuador, California’s two leading 
sources of foreign imported oil. 
Legacy of the 1969 spill
Given the disparity in oil types, worries have arisen 
that the state’s climate policies could cause a 
paradox – pushing the Monterey Shale’s coming 
oil boom into the lighter, cleaner crudes along the 
coast, rather than into the dirtier, heavier deposits 
under the badlands of Kern County.
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California’s oil lobby has warned that, if strict 
carbon regulations are applied to Calfornia crude 
oil production and refining, they will be forced to 
conduct a process known as “shuffling,” in which 
California refiners would export the state’s heavy, 
high-carbon oil to other countries, and then import 
lighter, lower-carbon oil from abroad. They note that 
only 39 percent of the crude oil refined in California 
is produced in the state. The remaining 61 percent 
comes from Alaska or foreign imports via oil tankers, 
or from western U.S. states by rail. Under shuffling, 
oil executives say, California oil would likely be 
replaced by imported sources of light, sweet oil.
Political realities suggest this will not happen. Oil 
industry lobbyists have recently backtracked on 
earlier suggestions that they would shuffle their 
oil supplies. They now say they will go where the 
political going is easiest – which means staying 
away from cities and the coast, where memories 
of the 1969 Santa Barbara offshore oil spill are still 
vivid and public opposition to oil drilling is strong.
“I don’t really expect that there will be much work 
in the Monterey outside of the San Joaquin Valley, 
at least for quite a while,” said Tupper Hull of the 
Western States Petroleum Association.16 “As you 
know, Los Angeles and the coast is a very strict 
regulatory environment. The San Joaquin is where 
most of the resource is.”
What’s more, the state’s complex climate policies 
may not allow shuffling. Adam Brandt, an assistant 
professor of Energy Resources Engineering at 
Stanford University and the state Air Resources 
Board’s chief expert on the climate impact of 
transportation fuels, says that the state’s cap and 
trade system, which is now in operation, and the 
Low Carbon Fuel Standard, which is now under 
court challenge, prohibit shuffling. All in-state 
sources of crude are averaged in a single basket 
for greenhouse gas intensity, with no differentiation 
between companies’ individual sources of in-state 
supply. 
“This issue is confusing, I’ll admit,” said Brandt. 
“But despite the real disparity in carbon intensity 
of California crudes, or because of it, the state has 
deliberately designed its rules to prevent that kind 
of shuffling.”17 
The upshot of all this is that the dirtiest portions 
of the Monterey Shale are likely to be developed 
first, making the overall prospect for an oil boom a 
distinctly carbon-intensive affair.
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Production methods: a primer
Predictions for California’s oil industry emissions are also complicated by the lack of clarity about 
which production methods will be used, and at what depth. Some of these variables could make 
the Monterey Shale output cleaner than current California crudes, while others would make it 
dirtier. Here is a summary:
• Depth. While oil is found less than 2,000 feet deep in fields like Midway-Sunset, companies 
must drill to between 6,000 feet and 15,000 feet to tap shale oil in the Monterey. The additional 
depth requires extra energy for drilling, well completion, pumping and all other activities, all 
adding up to an approximately 1.3 percent increase in total carbon intensity per 1,000 feet. 
However, deeper oil tends to be somewhat lighter and less viscous than shallower oil, as 
explained by Richard Behl, a geologist at CSU Long Beach. “What controls the gravity of oil is 
what type of organisms were buried there before oil formed …. whether the oil was collecting 
in reservoir rocks that over geological times was exposed to bacteria and degraded its 
composition,” Behl said. “A lot of shallower deposits are very heavy, but much of the Monterey 
Shale deposits are more deeply buried, so it probably will be lighter. It’s too speculative to say 
by how much, however.”18
• Fracking. Fracking has long been used in California oil production, with the first occurrence in the 
Whittier oilfield in 1953.
 
However, oil industry officials say that because of the complex nature 
of the Monterey Shale, fracking may be ineffective in many areas and other techniques such 
as acidizing may be more effective. However, no information is available about energy intensity 
of the fracking process. Stanford’s Adam Brandt says he is only now starting the months-long 
process of crunching that data for the ARB. Because fracking is currently unregulated and no 
reporting of the practice is required, state regulators do not know what proportion of the state’s 
oil is produced through fracking.
• Steam injection. This method – the injection of hot water vapor downhole – is a common 
way of melting extra-heavy crude that is too tar-like to be easily extracted through conventional 
drilling. Steam injection is by far the most energy-intensive and water intensive method 
used in California oil extraction. In 2007, 23 of the state’s 153 oilfields used steam injection, 
according to ARB data. A similar method is hot water flooding, which injects hot water instead 
of steam. Steam generation represents 41 percent of the California oil and gas industry’s GHG 
emissions, while combined heat and power (which includes hot water heating and other drilling-
related electricity use) causes another 22 percent, according to the ARB.
“When you see high values for carbon intensity at California oilfields, it’s almost always due in large 
part to steam injection or waterflooding,” said Brandt.19 He said the methods for extracting the 
Monterey Shale’s crude will be similar to anyone following the national debate over the Keystone 
XL pipeline. “You have extra-heavy crude, and the only way to get it out is via a process very similar 
to the ‘in situ’ production of the tar sands,” he said, referring to the Canadian practice of pumping 
steam down into the oil-bearing strata and waiting for the heat to melt the tar-like, compacted 
sands into a liquid that can be pumped up to the surface.
For the most part, Brandt noted, steam injection and hot waterflooding currently are used in 
relatively shallow depths in California, to a maximum of approximately 5,000 feet. While it is likely 
these methods will be adapted to the Monterey Shale, there is no guarantee they will be used at 
a greater rate than currently. 
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• Acidizing. As discussed in Next Generation’s two-part report about acidizing, oil companies 
operating in California say that many areas of the Monterey Shale do not respond well to fracking 
and instead give better results through the process of acidizing, which includes matrix acidizing 
and acid fracking. In these methods, large volumes of hydrofluoric acid are injected into the 
substrata to dissolve the rock and open up fractures so that the oil can flow. As with fracking, 
this practice is largely unregulated, so no information is available about what proportion of the 
state’s oil is extracted via acidizing, and no research has been carried out about the carbon 
intensity of acidizing.
• Clean tech. State regulators have created a system of incentives to support the use of “clean 
distributed generation technologies” to replace the natural gas that fires the steam flooding 
process and other oil well activities. These include a complex variety of low-carbon technologies 
– microturbines, fuel cells, and a thermal oxidizer integrated with a microturbine. One especially 
promising method is solar thermal enhanced oil recovery, with two test projects currently 
underway – Berry Petroleum with GlassPoint Solar in McKittrick, Kern County, and Chevron’s 
partnership with BrightSource Energy near Coalinga. In both cases, an array of solar concentrating 
mirrors tracks the sun, captures rays, then shines the concentrated light to heat the water into 
steam, which is then pumped down into the oil reservoir. This method is estimated to cut CO2 
emissions of oil extraction by up to 80 percent. All these projects are experimental, with no 
guarantee that they will prove successful or be used widely in the Monterey – or in other shale 
formations around the country or world.
A USA worth of emissions? Or two 
Keystones?
There are two ways of comparing greenhouse 
gas emissions for the Californiaoil industry: A 
broader scope, known as the “well-to-wheel 
lifecycle” approach, which adds the cumulative 
total of emissions from the oil’s production and 
final consumption, regardless of where the oil is 
eventually used, over the project’s entire lifetime; 
and a narrower scope that measures the annual 
rate  of in-state emissions from the “upstream” 
process of drilling, extracting and transporting the 
oil but does not measure refining or consumption. 
Both yardsticks have their weaknesses. The well-to-
wheel lifecycle approach might exaggerate the net 
carbon impact if Monterey Shale oil simply displaces 
imported sources of oil, and if it does not increase 
end-use consumption by the state’s transportation 
sector. The upstream-only approach does not show 
the overall impact on global greenhouse gas 
emissions of an up-or-down decision to develop the 
oil or instead leave all of it in the ground.
Well to wheel lifecycle approach. According to 
calculations by Argonne National Laboratory using 
data from ARB, the lifecycle emissions – extracting, 
transporting, refining and consuming – of the average 
barrel of California oil are equivalent to 0.5 metric 
tons of carbon dioxide.20 As a result, production 
of the Monterey Shale’s entire 15.4 billion barrels 
would release 7.7 billion metric tons of carbon 
dioxide, equivalent to 17 years of California’s total 
greenhouse gas emissions at 2010 levels, or about 
one year of total emissions for the United States.
This approach essentially measures the carbon 
cost of extracting the oil rather than leaving all of 
it untapped. Of course, there is no guarantee that 
the Monterey’s 15.4 billion barrels could actually be 
extracted. Given the current technical difficulties in 
accessing the oil amid its jumbled formations, there 
is a real possibility that a significantly lower proportion 
of that resource will be used. Nor is the speed of this 
process at all clear – over a few decades, or stretched 
out over a century? Another difficulty with this 
approach is that it does not recognize the likelihood 
that the Monterey’s production would displace 
imported supplies of crude, making little measurable 
impact on the in-state emissions of California’s own 
transportation sector. All these caveats suggest 
some prudence in drawing conclusions.
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Upstream only. It’s possible to construct a range 
of possible emissions scenarios by taking three 
potential rates of growth for the Monterey Shale, 
based on output rates in other states from 2007 to 
2012 – the North Dakota rate of 40 percent annual 
increase, the Texas rate of 14 percent, and the 
nationwide U.S. rate of 5.1 percent. Based on these 
scenarios, the California oil and gas industry’s annual 
output of greenhouse gases would rise by the 
following amounts from approximately 12.5 million 
metric tons of CO2 equivalent in 2015 (assuming no 
change from 2011).
The policy implications of the above scenarios vary 
wildly. The state’s climate plan mandates that 80 
million metric tons must be cut from the state’s 
overall annual emissions by 2020. If the state’s oil 
output were to grow by the U.S. rate, the impact 
on the climate plan’s goals would be moderate – 
still a step backward, but not unmanageable. If it 
were to grow by the North Dakota rate, however, 
the impact would be severe, forcing more drastic 
cuts in emissions elsewhere. 
Another point of comparison is the projected annual 
rate of emissions from the oil transported by the 
Keystone XL pipeline, which the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency has estimated at 27 million metric 
tons. If the California oil industry’s output were to 
grow at the North Dakota rate, its emissions would 
be twice as large as the Keystone XL emissions.
The above growth scenarios do not include 
significant increases in refinery emissions.21 The 
state’s 18 refineries have a total capacity of about 2 
million barrels per day, of which California’s current 
oil production supplies only about one-quarter. 
Federal law strictly limits crude oil exports from the 
United States to foreign nations; given the lack of 
any major oil pipelines that could send California 
crude to other states, it seems likely that most, 
if not all, Monterey Shale oil will remain in-state 
and will merely replace supplies of crude that are 
currently imported. 
In addition, California’s refining capacity is 
configured for a wide range of oil viscosity, including 
heavy imported crude. So a switch to local supplies 
would have little net effect on refineries’ energy 
use and emissions – leaving no basis to assume 
any substantial change of the refinery sector’s 
emissions under any of these scenarios.
For now, the Monterey Shale remains a mirage 
waiting to become reality. The wide gamut of 
possible scenarios – boom, mini-boom or bust? 
– means that the jury is still out on the possible 
climate impact of a net increase in oil production. As 
with other facets of the national and global debates 
over climate change, much remains unknown. 
But the success of California’s landmark climate 
policies are clearly at stake. Time will tell if the 
state’s leaders will remain as committed to existing 
climate goals when – and if – the black gold starts 
flowing from the Monterey Shale. 
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Part 5: Is California really like North Dakota?
The oil industry has been inflating its projections 
of jobs that could be created by a potential new 
California oil boom, according to independent 
economists who have reviewed the industry’s 
research and who say the state should cast a more 
skeptical eye on claims of a potential new oil boom 
in the Monterey Shale.
These economists’ view is bolstered by a little-
publicized study from a top oil research firm that 
found little likelihood of a resurgence in oil production 
in California over the next one to two decades.
Up until now, the runaway growth of shale oil 
and gas production in North Dakota, Texas and 
Pennsylvania have led some analysts to predict that 
California’s shale oil deposits, estimated to be the 
nation’s largest, could spawn a gusher of economic 
growth.
The oil industry has helped promote this vision, 
predicting millions of new jobs, a statewide boost 
in personal income as well as billions of dollars in 
tax revenues for the state and local governments.
The most optimistic – and most widely publicized 
– of the economic projections are contained in a 
study published by researchers at the University 
of Southern California, and funded by the state’s 
main oil lobbying group. Several leading California 
economists have criticized the study’s methodology, 
baseline data and conclusions as “unreliable.”
The USC study implicitly assumes a rapid rate of oil 
production growth. However, oil company engineers 
and geologists have not yet cracked the complex 
code of California’s shale deposits, and large-scale 
production there has not yet begun. If and when 
they do figure out how to extract the oil, the pace of 
growth is uncertain.
In addition, a December 2012 study by IHS CERA, 
a leading consulting firm to the oil and gas industry, 
came to markedly different conclusions from the 
USC study, predicting that the Monterey Shale’s 
promise will remain a mirage and will generate only 
minor economic benefit over the next two decades.
These rival forecasts seem likely to continue their 
role as political fodder in important policy battles. 
In 2014, the state will draw up new rules under a 
recently enacted law for oil regulations, SB4; further 
regulations may be discussed, and the issue could 
also be a factor in the statewide November election.
Predictions of an epic boom
The state’s emerging debate over how to regulate 
the oil industry was jolted in March 2013, when 
USC’s Price School of Public Policy and Global Energy 
Network issued “Powering California: the Monterey 
Shale and California’s Economic Future.” The study 
was funded by the Western States Petroleum 
Association (WSPA), which represents the state’s 
major oil producing and refining companies, and its 
conclusions were attention-grabbing.
The study predicted an epic oil boom in the Monterey 
Shale, with the following results:
• An increase of 512,000 net new jobs by 2015 
and 2.8 million net new jobs by 2020, linked 
directly and indirectly to oil production.
• Growth in per-capita GDP of 2.6 percent by 2015 
and 14.3 percent by 2020.
• State and local government tax collections grow 
by $4.5 billion in 2015 to $24.6 billion in 2020, 
the equivalent of 2.1 percent and 10.0 percent 
growth, respectively.
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Catharine Reheis-Boyd, president of WSPA, 
announced the study’s conclusions as “a game-
changing economic opportunity that California can’t 
afford to ignore.”  Later in the same day as the 
study’s release, Gov. Jerry Brown echoed the same 
note, saying, “The fossil fuel deposits in California 
are incredible, the potential is extraordinary.”
In the months of legislative debate that followed, the 
USC report was repeatedly cited in the Legislature, 
with backers calling it evidence of the Monterey 
Shale’s “magnificent potential for jobs.”
But despite the report’s broad influence, no 
independent analysis of its economic assumptions 
and methodology has been published to date.22 
Several leading academic economists who reviewed 
the study were puzzled by its findings, and baffled 
by its methodology.
Unrealistic scenarios
“The numbers seem too large to be believable,” said 
Jerry Nickelsburg of UCLA Anderson Forecast,23 the 
state’s primary economic forecasting institution.
Nickelsburg noted several factors that undermine 
the USC report’s methodology. First, he noted 
that the total direct employment of California’s 
upstream and midstream sectors was 21,244 as of 
2009.24 Second, by using conventionally accepted 
“multipliers” for calculating indirect and induced 
employment – that is, jobs created in other sectors 
by the trickle-down effect from oilfield workers and 
company spending – the total direct, indirect and 
induced employment for California’s upstream and 
midstream sectors is “probably no more than” 
100,000.
Meet the experts: Economists review the USC study
• Jerry Nickelsburg, Senior Economist at UCLA Anderson Forecast, the most oft cited of all 
economic forecasting agencies in California. Nickelsburg oversees economic modeling and 
forecasting for the United States, California, and the Los Angeles, Bay Area and Southern 
California regions.
• Olivier Deschenes, Associate Professor of Economics at UC Santa Barbara and Research 
Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. His work includes extensive published 
research on the economic impacts of climate change.
• Jesse Rothstein, Associate Professor at UC Berkeley’s Goldman School of Public Policy and 
Department of Economics. Rothstein, a former chief economist of the U.S. Labor Department, 
has published often on labor markets.
• Carol Zabin, Research Director of the UC Berkeley Center for Labor Research and Education. 
Zabin is a labor economist whose research focuses on the impact of climate change legislation 
and the green economy on California’s economy and workforce.
• Manuel Pastor, Professor of Sociology at University of Southern California. Pastor, an economist, 
has focused his research on economic development of low-income urban communities.
Each of the economists said the study’s findings were unreliable and inflated. They cast doubt on 
its methodology, which did not base its estimates on any projections for oil production or capital 
investment in California oil; instead, the study’s authors said they extrapolated from the effects of 
economic growth in North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming.
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The most recent analysis of total oil and gas industry 
employment in California, conducted in July 2013 by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and commissioned by the 
American Petroleum Institute, estimated that the 
industry employed nearly 800,000 Californians. But 
the economists consulted by Next Generation said 
that using that number as a baseline for future job 
growth in a boom scenario is problematic because 
it includes the natural gas industry, which would not 
be included in any oil boom in the Monterey Shale, 
and also includes employment in downstream 
sectors such as refineries and gas stations, which 
are unlikely to grow in any oil boom scenario.25
Using even the PricewaterhouseCoopers estimate, 
however, USC’s projections would require truly 
astronomical growth.
The study’s scenario of 2.8 million net new jobs 
by 2020 represents a mean value between its low 
and high growth scenarios of 1,206,700 jobs and 
4,425,000 jobs, respectively.
“What kind of growth rate do you need to get from 
there to 2.8 million jobs?” Nickelsburg asked. “This 
leads one to question what’s really going on in this 
study.”
The study cited its low-growth scenario as “the 
most conservative path, which involves what we 
call the “North Dakota scenario.”” The study states:
We conducted analysis for California as well as 
three oil boom states: North Dakota, Wyoming 
and South Dakota. These three states have 
recently experienced the effects of a significant 
oil drilling boom.
As mentioned above, any state-to-state modeling 
is problematic because the publicly available 
employment data includes apples-to-oranges 
dissimilarities, including sectors that are unlikely 
to grow in any conceivable expansion of California 
oil output. Even so, the gap between the USC 
projections and historical trends is notable. 
North Dakota experienced a 78 percent increase 
in total employment for all industries in oil and gas 
producing counties from 2005–2012. In contrast, 
USC’s median scenario projection would mean a 
350 percent increase in oil and gas employment 
(direct, indirect and induced) from 2011–2020, and 
its “high-enhanced drilling” scenario would mean a 
558 percent increase over the same period.
How do multipliers calculate job creation?
In assessing the economic impact of any industry, economists of all stripes use “multipliers” to 
determine direct, indirect and induced effects. In the case of California’s oil industry:
• Direct effects result from production in the oil and gas sector itself.
• Indirect contributions result from the broader supply chain of firms supporting production.
• Induced effects result when employees of all these firms spend their incomes on consumer 
goods, ranging from food and clothing to medical services.
Most economists use the IMPLAN system of multipliers, which vary by sector depending on how 
much contracting they do locally and other factors. For example, oil refineries have an employment 
multiplier of 9.0343, which means that every job created directly in that sector creates 8.0343 jobs 
in other businesses and industries. Oil and gas drilling has a multiplier of 3.8605, while gasoline 
stations have a multiplier of only 1.6961.
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The economists who reviewed the USC study 
said North Dakota is not a legitimate basis of 
comparison for macroeconomic projections for 
California, no matter what the scenario. North 
Dakota has a population of 700,000 people, with 
a small, agriculture-based economy that was 
proportionately overwhelmed by the state’s recent 
oil boom. California has 38 million people and a 
huge, complex economy, of which the state’s oil 
industry represents only a tiny fraction.
The differences compound from there: North 
Dakota’s oil industry began its relatively fast growth 
rate from a very low baseline – only about 100,000 
barrels per day as recently as 2006, thus statistically 
exaggerating its percent rate of increase to over 
800,000 barrels per day currently – while California 
is already the nation’s third largest oil producer. 
Using North Dakota’s explosive growth as an analog 
to California’s potential therefore exaggerates the 
impact a new oil boom could have on the California 
economy.
“This report’s methods are not credible,” said Jesse 
Rothstein of UC Berkeley, a specialist in labor 
market economics.26 “It assumes that a 10 percent 
increase in oil and gas production in California would 
have the same proportional effect on the state’s 
highly diversified economy as would a similarly 
sized increase in North Dakota, where the economy 
is much more heavily concentrated in the fossil fuel 
extraction sector.”
A more fundamental problem with the USC 
study, the economists pointed out, is that its high 
growth scenario appears to have no factual basis. 
According to oil production data from the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, South Dakota 
and Wyoming have experienced nothing resembling 
an oil boom. South Dakota oil production increased 
from 4,024 barrels per day in 2005 to 4,805 barrels 
per day in 2012 – a 3 percent annual increase and 
close to the state’s trend over recent decades. 
Wyoming’s oil production grew during that period 
from 141,838 barrels per day to 158,123 barrels 
per day – a 1.8 percent annual increase. Over the 
past three decades, Wyoming’s production has 
decreased by more than 50 percent overall.
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Peter Gordon, the primary co-author of the USC 
study’s economic projection, offered the following 
explanation for the inclusion of references to South 
Dakota and Wyoming:
Ours is a standard time series model. We 
analyze California trends with two tweaks: 1. 
New oil drilling forecasts from EIA; 2. A new 
California GDP-to-drilling relationship.  We took 
this one from the North Dakota experience 
to 2010, the early part of their boom and the 
most conservative of the oil boom states we 
evaluated. 3. Our baseline for California was a 
trend extrapolation of California GDP growth. It 
is as simple as that.  Given our time and budget 
constraints, this is all we could do.27
Other experts who reviewed the USC study were 
puzzled by Gordon’s response.
“As others have mentioned, the methodology is not 
transparent,” said Olivier Deschenes of UC Santa 
Barbara, a specialist in econometrics and labor 
markets.28 “I did not understand the methodology 
for the employment impacts.”
Deschenes particularly questioned the study’s 
macroeconomic analysis and modeling. “I spent 
two hours reading Chapter 3 and I continue to have 
a hard time understanding how the numbers in the 
tables are computed.”
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Part 6: Keeping the story straight: industry reports at odds on 
California oil
California’s growing debate over the environmental 
risks of oil production has echoed with claims that 
an oil boom lies just around the next bend – as long 
as we keep overly harsh regulations from steering 
us off the tracks.
Expectations have been bolstered by a study by 
the University of Southern California that projected 
millions of new jobs and billions of dollars in tax 
revenue for the state and local governments. The 
study was paid for by the Western States Petroleum 
Association (WSPA), the California oil industry’s 
main lobbying organization. But some of the 
state’s leading economists view these promises as 
unreliable and based on incorrect assumptions.
More broadly, the question of whether the Monterey 
Shale will bring more prosperity to the state remains 
unanswered. As California continues debate over oil 
policies in 2014 and beyond, the realpolitik of jobs 
and the economy will remain as central to decision 
making as it always has been in American politics.
Cold water from an unlikely source
Debunking of the USC study has come recently 
from an unlikely source – a separate study 
commissioned by WSPA. Antonio Avalos and David 
Vera, economics professors at California State 
University at Fresno, were commissioned by WSPA 
to carry out projections of economic impact only for 
the San Joaquin Valley. Their report, “The Petroleum 
Industry and the Monterey Shale: Current Economic 
Impact and the Economic Future of the San Joaquin 
Valley,” released in October 2013, predicted much 
more modest job gains under two scenarios:
• Between 2,151 and 9,347 net new jobs (direct, 
indirect and induced) by 2020 under what Avalos 
and Vera call the “high resource scenario,” 
equivalent to the U.S. Energy Department’s 
predicted rate of growth for “tight” shale oil 
nationwide.
• Between 2,151 and 46,649 net new jobs by 
2020 under a “high resource-oil boom scenario,” 
equivalent to the North Dakota rate of growth.
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Because the eight-county San Joaquin Valley studied 
in the CSU Fresno report accounts for three-quarters 
of California’s oil production, according to state data, 
the high-growth projection of 46,649 jobs by 2020 
would be the equivalent of roughly 62,198 new 
jobs statewide29 – far less than the USC study’s 
median prediction of 2.8 million new jobs. However, 
even the CSU Fresno study’s numbers must be 
discounted somewhat because they include jobs 
in refinery production and gasoline station sales, 
neither of which would be likely to grow in any oil 
boom scenario.
Vera says that that the CSU Fresno report and the 
USC version “are not fully comparable,” but declined 
to comment otherwise on the contrast between 
the results:
Our study focuses on the San Joaquin Valley 
only, while the USC study examines the 
entire State of California. The difference in 
scope leads to major differences in data 
availability and thus in methodology. For 
example our main variable in the forecasting 
exercise is real personal income at the county 
level while for the USC report is real GDP 
per capita at the state level, not available at 
the county level. Consequently, findings in 
the reports are not fully comparable. 
Refineries, gas stations unlikely to see job increases
California’s upstream and midstream sectors, which comprise oil exploration/production and 
transportation, respectively, would be directly affected by any oil production increase in the Monterey 
Shale. In contrast, the downstream sector, which comprises refineries, petrochemicals, wholesale 
and retail, is likely to remain unaffected by any such increase, for several reasons:
• As noted in Part 4 of our series, the state’s 18 oil refineries have a total capacity of about 2 million 
barrels per day, of which California’s current oil production supplies only about one-quarter, thus 
giving the state much excess capacity to absorb local production without building new refineries.
• Given the state’s political and regulatory climate, companies would find it extremely difficult to 
get regulatory approval to build new refinery capacity, as shown by Chevron’s recent difficulties 
in trying to expand its Richmond refinery.
• Federal law imposes a virtual ban on exports of crude oil to other nations.
• California has no significant pipelines that could be used for shipping to other U.S. states, and 
obtaining permits to build any such pipelines through California would be politically very difficult.
• California’s retail gasoline prices are highly unlikely to be depressed by local fuel supply, just as the 
glut of crude in Cushing, Oklahoma, has not seriously affected gas prices elsewhere in the nation.
• California drivers are not going to drive more miles or buy more gas-guzzling cars just because their 
gasoline and diesel is locally pumped rather than being imported from Saudi Arabia or Ecuador.
• While roughly 50 percent of California’s total refinery capacity is for production of gasoline, the 
rest is for diesel, aviation and bunker fuels, chemicals, asphalt and other products, none of which 
are likely to sell more just because the petroleum from which they are sourced is locally produced.
• California’s exports of refined petroleum products, including petrochemicals, have fluctuated 
since the 1980s with no measurable decrease despite the 50 percent drop in the state’s oil 
production during that period. Because of this de-linkage, it seems unlikely that exports of refined 
petroleum products would increase substantially if in-state crude production were to increase.
• California’s refining capacity is configured for a wide range of oil viscosity, including heavy 
imported crude. So a switch from imports to local crude would not necessarily require significant 
equipment modifications.
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(…) We did not have access to the raw data 
or any of the code used in the estimations 
in the USC report. The USC report does 
not clearly explain the methodology or data 
employed (…) It may be valid, we just can’t 
tell with the information that is available.30
Interestingly, WSPA has repeatedly publicized the 
results of the USC study, but has put little effort into 
publicizing the results of the CSU Fresno study.
Industry’s top consultants predict no 
new jobs
An even more bearish set of conclusions about 
Monterey Shale job growth has come from yet 
another unlikely corner – the petroleum industry’s 
leading consultancy, IHS CERA. The firm, headed 
by Pulitzer Prize-winning author and pundit Daniel 
Yergin, has close ties to major oil firms and often 
takes bullish views of production potential. But 
IHS CERA’s December 2012 report, America’s New 
Energy Future: The Unconventional Oil and Gas 
Revolution and the US Economy, Volume 2: State 
Economic Contributions, concluded that California’s 
“unconventional” oil sector, which is almost entirely 
synonymous with the Monterey Shale, will produce 
almost zero new oil or new jobs for at least the next 
decade. Its chief conclusions were these:
• California unconventional oil will produce virtually 
nothing through 2020, then 10,000 barrels 
daily in 2025, 40,000 barrels daily in 2030, and 
60,000 barrels per day in 2035. These amounts 
are small fractions of the state’s overall output 
of 536,000 barrels daily, and they comprise an 
even tinier fraction of the bonanza promised by 
the oil lobby.
• California jobs, income and tax revenues will 
experience modest increases – but with a 
huge caveat. By 2020, net new jobs (direct, 
indirect and induced) are projected to increase 
by 57,105, annual labor income will rise by $3.8 
billion, and state and local tax revenue will jump 
by $1.6 billion. However, because in-state oil 
production is expected to be flat, these benefits 
will be generated only by spill-over spending 
from other states such as North Dakota and 
Texas as California-based companies Chevron 
and Occidental benefit from out-of-state work. 
Examples could include additional income to 
headquarters employees or stockholders of 
these companies, out-of-state work by California-
based consultants and oil service providers, or 
exports by California manufacturers of oilfield 
equipment. Oil production from the Monterey 
Shale will add no direct, indirect or induced 
economic benefits.
In subsequent interviews, IHS-CERA experts stood 
behind the study’s findings of negligible job growth. 
Mohsen Bonakdarpour, managing director of IHS 
Economics, said:
There has been a lot of speculation and 
debate about the Monterey Shale, but our 
energy team does not see those results. We 
have much more conservative estimates for 
California.31
Pete Stark, the IHS-CERA research director on 
unconventional oil, said oil companies’ success 
in North Dakota and Texas shale was likely to be 
stymied in the Monterey:
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We have followed Monterey activity with 
interest but have observed little evidence that 
the local operators have broken the code to 
unlock production from this complex package 
of tight rocks. … We have characterized 
the Monterey with Churchill’s pertinent 
observation about Russia – ‘It is a riddle, 
wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.’ It 
will take substantial R&D investment and 
time to understand and unlock even part of 
the technically recoverable oil cited by the 
EIA. We expect that operators like Oxy … 
will peck away with close-in development 
drilling in and around the old producing fields 
and structures. This will yield more of the 
tight oil resource. If companies unlock oil 
production from deeper zones within active 
oil generating systems this could increase 
volumes of lighter oil similar to that from the 
large tight shale oil plays like the Bakken and 
Eagle Ford. Apart from that we will continue 
to track activity but will not hold our breath 
awaiting a game changer.32
Although the IHS-CERA findings were the first 
comprehensive expert analysis of the Monterey 
Shale’s potential, they appear to have gone entirely 
unnoticed. Database searches on Google and Nexis 
reveal no mention anywhere of the IHS-CERA 
findings on California from the report’s release in 
December 2012 to the present.33
The IHS-CERA pessimism about the unconventional 
oil in the Monterey Shale received the tacit backing 
of the U.S. Department of Energy in mid-2013 when 
the Department released its Annual Energy Outlook 
2013.
Under its “high resource” scenario – essentially the 
most optimistic boom conditions – total U.S. national 
oil production would rise by more than one-third 
during 2013-2020, but California’s total production 
would fall by 6.5 percent. Although the report did 
not specify how much of the state’s production was 
likely to come from the Monterey Shale, it made 
clear that the results there would be minuscule.
Weak grounds for boom boosterism
So is California on the verge of a historic oil bonanza 
that will bring a surge in prosperity, as the USC 
study claims? Or will the results be slim pickings, as 
most other experts believe?
Under any scenario, California could use more jobs 
– the state still had 1,611,926 unemployed workers 
as of October 2013.34 But California has already 
been adding about 300,000 net new jobs annually 
since mid-2010, when the economic recovery 
began, according to federal labor data. While an 
oil boom, even an unlikely one, would clearly add 
some jobs, it’s worth taking the time to understand 
the true employment implications of a boom – and 
weighing those against the environmental and 
climate implications of drilling and burning more oil.
But such a boom is still a hypothetical, future event. 
In the meantime, the state can continue pursuing its 
role as a global leader in clean energy job creation, 
climate change mitigation and preparedness, and 
overall quality of life. Regardless of what happens 
with the Monterey Shale, the state’s diverse 
economy and penchant for technology innovation 
are likely to continue to be the real California Gold 
Rush.
Page 27 | Drilling the Monterey Shale
1 In addition to the primary acid components, other chemicals used 
include surfactants, solvents, corrosion inhibitors and oxidizers.  The 
acid solution may also be applied in other forms such as foams, gels 
or emulsions. The volume injected is typically low, such as 5 gallons 
per well foot, but there are reports that higher volumes of as much 
as 250 gallons per foot are being used.
2 Interview with author at “Tight Oil Reservoirs California” 
conference, Bakersfield, May 30, 2013.
3 Interview with author at “Tight Oil Reservoirs California” 







5 Personal communication to author, June 14, 2013.
6 Telephone interview with author, July 13, 2013.
7 A written non-response came from Halliburton, one of the state’s 
primary oilfield services providers. In a June 12, 2013 letter to 
Pavley, the company’s Director of State and Local Governmental 
Affairs, Stephen Flaherty, responded that the company’s “services 
comply with all applicable health and safety laws and regulations, 
and works with its customers to ensure that compliance … I am 
sure you understand that as a matter of company policy and practice 
Halliburton does not speak to questions about the particular services 
it provides to, or the circumstances of, its individual customers.”
8 Email to author, July 25, 2013, from Alison apRoberts, information 
officer, California Energy Commission: “California onshore crude 
oil production peaked in 1985 at 354.8 million barrels. Onshore 
production last year tallied 182.2 million barrels. So one could 
say that there was a system in place of pipeline connections to 
handle 172.6 million barrels more than today. What portion of that 
1985 distribution capacity may have been retired or mothballed is 
unknown but likely only a modest portion. In addition, refiners and 
other parties in California are continuing to pursue rail-by-crude 
projects to take advantage of less expensive crude oil opportunities 
like Bakken and Canadian crude oils. This means that new crude oil 
production in California could be loaded onto rail cars for delivery to 
refineries that have rail receipt capability. This trend in conjunction 
with the state’s spare pipeline capacity can therefore negate the 
need to build additional pipeline capacity over the near to mid-term.”
9 Email to author, Aug. 10, 2013.
10 Email to author, Aug. 13, 2013. Medlock continued: “Firms will, 
however, make an assessment of the direction of the market before 
Notes
actively developing a field.  But, there are many factors that go into 
such an assessment, such as global economic health and demand 
growth (China demand is a huge issue at the moment), and trends 
in various things that effect global supply (such as growth in Iraqi 
production, what is happening in West Africa, what is happening 
generally with light tight oil production across the US, what is 
happening with Canadian oil sands, etc.).”
11 Email to author, Aug. 10, 2013.
12 Telephone interview, May 13, 2013
13 Telephone interview, May 10, 2013.
14 Interview, May 14, 2013.
15 Interview, May 24, 2013.
16 Email to author, July 25, 2013, from Amgad Elgowainy, Principal 
Energy Systems Analyst of the Argonne National Laboratory’s Center 
for Transportation Research.
17 In recent months, the Western States Petroleum Association 
and researchers at UC Davis have engaged in a vigorous back-and-
forth debate over the effects of AB 32 on the refining sector. These 
important issues are separate from the subject matter at hand.
18 With API under 10 and 20, respectively.
19 Interview, May 14, 2013.
20 Interview, May 24, 2013.
21 Telephone interview, May 13, 2013
22 A very useful critique of oilfield production scenarios, including 
those related to the USC report, is contained in a December 
2013 report by J. David Hughes for the Post Carbon Institute and 
Physicians Scientists & Engineers for Healthy Energy. Drilling 
California: A Reality Check on the Monterey Shale, available at 
www.postcarbon.org/reports/Drilling-California_FINAL.pdf
23 Telephone interview, July 29, 2013
24 “Assessment of Petroleum Industry Economic Impact to the State 
of California,” Purvin & Gertz, 2011. Available here.
25 According to the economists consulted by Next Generation, the 
downstream sector, which comprises refineries, petrochemicals, 
wholesale and retail, is likely to remain unaffected by a boom in 
oil production in the Monterey Shale, for several reasons: A) As 
noted in Part 4 of our series, the state’s 18 oil refineries have a total 
capacity of about 2 million barrels per day, of which California’s 
current oil production supplies only about one-quarter, thus giving 
the state much excess capacity to absorb local production without 
building new refineries; B) given the state’s political and regulatory 
climate, companies would find it extremely difficult to get regulatory 
Page 28 | Drilling the Monterey Shale
approval to build new refinery capacity, as shown by Chevron’s 
recent difficulties in trying to expand its Richmond refinery; C) federal 
law imposes a virtual ban on exports of crude oil to other nations; 
D) California has no significant pipelines that could be used for 
shipping to other U.S. states; E) California’s retail gasoline prices are 
highly unlikely to be depressed by local fuel supply, just as the glut 
of crude in Cushing, Oklahoma, has not seriously affected gas prices 
elsewhere in the nation; F) California drivers are not going to drive 
more miles or buy more gas-guzzling cars just because their gasoline 
and diesel is locally pumped rather than being an import from Saudi 
Arabia or Ecuador; G) While roughly 50 percent of California’s total 
refinery capacity is for production of gasoline, the rest is for diesel, 
aviation and bunker fuels, chemicals, asphalt and other products, 
none of which are likely to sell more just because the petroleum 
from which they are sourced is locally produced; H) California’s 
exports of refined petroleum products, including petrochemicals, 
have fluctuated since the 1980s with no measurable decrease 
despite the 50 percent drop in the state’s oil production during that 
period. Because of this de-linkage, it seems unlikely that exports of 
refined petroleum products would increase substantially if in-state 
crude production were to increase; I) California’s refining capacity is 
configured for a wide range of oil viscosity, including heavy imported 
crude. So a switch from imports to local crude would not necessarily 
require significant equipment modifications.
26 Personal email, July 10, 2013
27 Personal email, July 18, 2013
28 Personal email, July 30, 2013
29 This may slightly understate the statewide total because it does 
not account for headquarters and services jobs outside of oil-
producing regions, but any undercounting would be minuscule in 
comparison with the large discrepancy in overall projections.
30 Personal email, Nov. 4, 2013
31 Telephone interview, Oct. 1, 2013
32 Personal email, Oct. 1, 2013
33 The IHS-CERA communications team promoted the overall report 
in press releases and other materials but did not mention its unusual 
California findings.
34 Recent net job growth for California: 217,443 from January 
through October of 2013; 326,937 in 2012; 294,092 in 2011. 
Accessed here.
